SpaceX received mixed responses when announcing limits on Starlink in Ukraine this month. Gwynne Shotwell, SpaceX’s president and chief operating officer, stated they would be limiting use of their satellites in Ukraine for drone warfare without specifying how.
Photo of war destruction in Ukraine by Алесь Усцінаў
This scenario highlights the problems that private tech companies face when providing products and services in areas of active or potential conflict. The paradox is how to get publicity for providing services that can inherently be used for a combat advantage or in the context of warfare activities - especially unconventional warfare - while keeping one’s company out of the conflict. Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak emphasized this point in his tweet telling SpaceX to pick a side.
Unlike natural disasters and emergencies, conflict inherently adds the risk of services being used as provided or modified for defensive or offensive purposes. Private tech companies can fall in a gray area of responsibility when they contract without addressing these issues. Rather than focus on whether defensive and offensive operations were included in an agreement, it should be alarming that such uses were not specifically addressed at the beginning.
In a highly circulated statement at a conference in Washington, D.C., Shotwell said the satellite internet service was “never meant to be weaponized.”
Shotwell did not have a clear response to the question of whether the services were anticipated to be used for offensive purposes when they were first sent. She claimed they did not fully know, despite an article from the Times as early as March 18, 2022 where a Ukrainian drone unit acknowledged relying on a secure Starlink satellite system “donated to them by Elon Musk.” Later in April 2022, Veronika Masenk wrote a handy guide describing how to access Internet in Ukraine from SpaceX, which included references to military use. Starlink general terms of service also lack language addressing these special circumstances.
SpaceX’s explanation either speaks to the naiveté of the company when it began to provide services in Ukraine at the very start of the conflict, or the result of a shortsighted grasp for a quick corporate branding win, or an attempt to disguise a monetarily motivated change. SpaceX announced in December a new project called Starshield to “support national security efforts.” This service would likely be priced differently to the commercially available Starlink satellite network.
The issue does not seem to be about standing up to authoritarian regimes, as Musk expressed support for Starlink being activated in Iran as early as September last year. Starlink terminals must be smuggled into Iran as described by the Times, where their operation is seen as illegal by the Iranian government.
Although Iranian protesters are striving for resolution through largely peaceful protest, the line between enabling conflict and the communications to prepare for (and sustain) conflict is blurry. It is possible for SpaceX to make a similar announcement limiting services in Iran in the future under the precedent it has set with Ukraine.
A recent OpEd in The Hill appealing for Starlink in Afghanistan highlights the main issue with providing satellite internet services amidst conflict. Resistance and revolutionary groups will seek to use the secure networks to organize and strengthen all of their efforts, regardless if the services are ostensibly only for humanitarian efforts. In Ukraine, SpaceX is the same as other private tech companies like Planet, Capella Space, and Maxar providing services and products. All have contributed to the successful execution of military operations in the region.
This particular controversy seems to be manufactured entirely by SpaceX’s poorly worded decision and timing of their announcement, but it sheds light on potential issues that other private companies might face when choosing to provide services in conflict zones. Inversely, governments will hopefully more carefully consider which private industry companies they will partner with for national security and the wording of these agreements.
I don't think that most non-military equipment providers really have the experience to look for the "what ifs" and they'll have a learning curve. But after a short while the agreements will cover many but never all of the contingencies that will occur.