The Revolution Will Be on Telegram
Prigozhin's Gamble And What Happens When The Dust Settles
The events of this weekend were a whirlwind. Prominent media outlets could clearly not keep up, with conflicting headlines lingering for hours under breaking news. Most of my updates were from Telegram posts reported by generally reputable Instagram accounts, obviously taken with a healthy grain of salt.
My prevailing theory before the events of Friday was that Prigozhin would not make a move until he secured reliable political alliances, even if those were not detectable; and that he wouldn’t go after Moscow because it wouldn’t be in his interest to do so. I believe that it is accurate that Wagner does not have the resources to carry out such a coup directly (as claimed by Prigozhin according to an ISW report from May 29). Also it would be far easier to operate outside of Russia if Wagner wanted to inflict harm on Russian objectives while minimizing risk to personnel and using considerably less resources.
Photo of a Recruiting PMC Wagner Group Billboard, Russia by Alexander Davronov, provided by Wikimedia Commons.
What Prigozhin accomplished by marching towards Moscow briefly - with probably no intent of going all the way - was to see what Putin and the Ministry of Defense were going to do in response to a threat of this nature. While some focus on the lackluster response, it is worth noting that in the Lipetsk Oblast, the roads to Moscow were being excavated by tractors or construction equipment in order to impede Wagner if they continued - slightly more than just putting up sandbags and large trucks nearer to central Moscow.
More prominent academics than myself have posited a few hypotheses for why Prigozhin executed this seeming feint of a coup. Listing them from most outlandish to most believable in my opinion:
Prigozhin staged this on behalf of Putin to justify further restrictions and increased martial law within Russia, and that it had to be done this way since the small drone attack on the Kremlin and other reports of incursions at the Russian border have not been met with a resounding wave of patriotic rage.
Losing patience and increasingly frustrated with the Russian MoD, Prigozhin simply got out over his skis and we should take him at his word that he only meant to protest and force change in military senior leadership towards officers more sympathetic to him and his desired status for him and Wagner as war heroes.
Sensing growing dissatisfaction with the war in Ukraine, Prigozhin utilized speed of action and nontraditional media (Telegram) to make a media spectacle that gives Wagner space away from the Ukrainian counteroffensive - you can’t fail at defending against something if you aren’t there - and also to test the waters for his ambitions of greater influence in Russian politics. In short, he never intended to breach or occupy Moscow, but by suggesting he would he can both get a sense of the appetite for disruption and also distance himself briefly from the war in Ukraine.
Now, it is just speculation as to how safe Prigozhin considers himself from direct retaliation by Putin. Having been working in the shadows as a contractor with direct ties to Putin, referred to as ‘Putin’s chef’ for his lucrative catering contracts with the Kremlin, it is possible that Prigozhin has some confidence in his self-preservation skills. This could be another reason for him to so quickly accept the deal, and to order his own troops to withdraw. While he didn’t accomplish a reshuffling of senior leadership that he was angling for, he still takes away some useful information as he probes towards increased importance in the political landscape. He made excellent use of Telegram networks to broadcast his message quickly, showing that speed of narrative is still an effective tool enabled well by the current technology.
As for why Putin acquiesced to a compromise so quickly? He loses face no matter what, but for now, by guaranteeing former Wagner operatives who did not participate in the coup a chance to join the military he is addressing the biggest priority, which is having personnel for the conflict in Ukraine. Second, he has “banished” Prigozhin and other Wagner conscripts to Belarus, a country whose president has previously turned over Wagner detainees to Moscow in 2020, and “there is no apparent reason why he would not do so again,” according to ISW. I believe in these coming days or weeks that Putin is watching carefully to see who expresses support or tacit approval for his exiled foe, while he shores up and reaffirms support from his current allies.